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Existing economic theories of the evolution of altruism between kinship mem-
bers usually emphasize the role that altruism can play in facilitating coor-
dination among kin to achieve an otherwise unachievable eﬃcient (in terms
of ﬁtness) equilibrium. In this paper, we explore the background environ-
ment against which backward altruism was likely to appear. The instinct
of sustaining one’s own life drives one to save for one’s old age. However,
since social mechanisms were not sophisticated in a primitive society, the
rate of return on savings was not high. As a consequence, the resources that
remain for the children might be limited. Suppose a cultural menchanism or
a mutation caused an individual to become backward-altruistic. She would
then expect her children to adopt the same attitude as herself, and take care
of her in her old age. With this expectation in mind, she would avoid inef-
ﬁcient savings voluntarily so that her children could obtain more resources.
Thus, backward altruism in our model does not play a role of coordination,
but helps parents to avoid ineﬃcient resource disposition. We analyze the
possible appearance of backward altruism as the rate of return on savings
changes.
11 Introduction
Biologist W. D. Hamilton made two distinct lines of contribution to the
theory of evolution of human behavior.1 The ﬁrst (1966) concerns the evolu-
tionary impact of changes in age-speciﬁc mortality; in particular, it is proved
that the if a mutation decreases the mortality of post-reproduction ages,
then it should not have any positive selection eﬀect. Hamilton’s second line
of contribution (1964 a,b) concerns the evolution of altruism among close
relatives; it explains when and why certain altruistic behavior can arise as
an outcome of evolutionary dynamics among kinship members.2
One subtle tension between these two lines of contribution by Hamilton
is related to the existence of “backward altruism,” by which we mean the
altruism (ﬁlial piety) from reproductive children to their post-reproductive
parent. Speciﬁcally, transferring goods from the young child to the old parent
obviously increases the former’s mortality while reducing that of the latter.
Since the young child is still reproductive and the old parent is not, according
to Hamilton (1966), such an altruism-supported backward transfer is unlikely
to be selected. This is the subtle tension we just referred to.
There have been several hypotheses in the literature that try to explain
the appearance of kinship altruism. Bergstrom (1995) shows that in a prison-
ers’ dilemma game, as long as the average payoﬀ of being cooperative is large
(relative to the payoﬀ corresponding to the selﬁsh strategy), then a cooper-
ative mutant can survive or even dominate when these games are repeatedly
1The contribution itself is not restricted to the human species, but here we only em-
phasize its implications for human beings.
2Several economists have also contributed to the literature on the evolution of human
preferences. See for instance Jack Hirshleifer (1978), Robert Frank (1988), Alan R. Rogers
(1994), Ted Bergstrom (1995), and Oded Stark (1995); we shall come back to some of them
later. Ingeman Hansson and Charles Stuart (1990) and Arthur Robson (1992) had some
discussion concerning the evolution of emotion and risk attitude.
1played by siblings. Oded Stark (1995) shows that if a young person’s ﬁlial
attitude toward her old parents can inﬂuence her own children’s attitude
toward herself in the future, then she will have an incentive to provide back-
ward transfers, just to demonstrate to her kids how they are expected to
behave when they grow up.3 The common role of altruism in such litera-
ture is to coordinate or facilitate kin agents to adopt a mutually-beneﬁcial
strategy combination, which would not have been chosen otherwise.
If the existence of post-reproductive parents can beneﬁt the children di-
rectly or indirectly, then it is not at all surprising to observe the appearance
of backward altruism, as was shown in Lee (2003). But strictly speaking,
being nice to people who can potentially help us is not really altruistic; al-
truism is better captured by the scenario of being nice to people who are
unable to help us back. In human history and in this day and age, indeed
we observe much backward altruism toward weak and post-reproductive par-
ents, who are unable to assist their children in various aspects, and appear
to be “useless” in terms of selection. The purpose of this paper is to investi-
gate the possible appearance of backward altruism when parents are neither
productive nor reproductive. It may not be appropriate to dichotomize the
old parents into useless and useful types, but it is theoretically important
to explore the possible appearance of backward altruism when parents are
unable to provide downward service or transfer to their children.
There is a diﬀerence between the case of parents who are assumed useful
3There are also some economic theories of kinship transfers instead of kinship altruism.
Gary Becker (1976) argues that, as long as the parent provides net transfers to her chil-
dren, the children’s backward transfers may actually be a strategic move of showing their
superﬁcial obedience, with the expectation that their parent will eventually leave them
more net bequests. This is known as “the rotten kid hypothesis”. Hillard Kaplan (1994)
and Ronald Lee (2003) show that if old parents, although at their post-reproductive ages,
can provide familial support such as helping take care of the grandchildren, then backward
transfers may still be consistent with a positive selection.
2and the case of those who are assumed useless. When parents are useful in
terms of selection, their survival is a desirable status. The only reason that
their children may not support them is some kind of coordination failure,
either due to obstacles imbedded in a prisoners’ dilemma (Bergstrom 1995),
or due to the lack of commitment by future generations (Stark 1995). In
either case, backward altruism often serves the purpose of enhancing the
(subjective) reward of adopting the cooperative strategy. But when parents
are useless, supporting the old no longer seems to be a desirable thing worth
coordinating. Then the question is: might backward altruism arise for other
reasons? Analyzing this scenario helps us derive the objective environment
against which backward altruism is likely to appear. These conditions then
may help historians or anthropologists infer the transfer structure of a given
ancient society.
To make our discussion compatible with the conceptual scenario of Hamil-
ton’s, we consider an age-speciﬁc life structure with a condensed two-age life
periods: young and old. Suppose people can produce goods and reproduce
oﬀspring only in their young age. If a young person has the instinct to sur-
vive to old age, then she has to save for her old age. In a primitive society,
however, there were no eﬃcient ways of savings. These ineﬀective savings
crowded out the consumption of children, which in turn diminished their sur-
vival probability. If, however, an individual expected her children to support
her old age’s necessary consumption, then she did not have to save as much,
and as a result the the resources that would otherwise have gone into sav-
ings could be used instead to support more of the children’s survival, which
obviously would improve selection. In short, out theory predicts that the
appearance of backward altruism may be related to the rate of return or eﬃ-
ciency of the saving mechanism. Evidently, the coordination between kinship
members, be it softwired culturally or hardwired genetically, was still impor-
tant for the appearance of backward altruism in a primitive society. Thus,
3the theory proposed here is complementary to that in Bergstrom (1995) or
Stark (1995).
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we intro-
duce the formal model, and derive the dynamic decision speciﬁcations of in-
dividuals and the corresponding selection criterion. Sections 3 interprets the
literature of backward transfers using our model, and explains the distinction
embodied in our approach. Sections 4 and 5 present the main propositions
and explain under what conditions backward altruism is likely to appear.
Section 6 uses some numerical evidence to provide us with a more speciﬁc
understanding of the advantage of backward altruism. The seventh section
relaxes our assumptions and generalizes the analysis along some directions.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Model
Let us consider a one-sex overlapping generation model, in which each person
lives either 1 or 2 periods. The ﬁrst period is called young, and the second is
coined old.4 To facilitate our presentation, we always write “she” and “her”
as the subject and object.
2.1 A Simpliﬁed Life Structure
At the beginning of a person’s young age, she has a natural fertility of bearing
¯ n children. For a typical individual, the number of her children that can
survive to the beginning of their own young life period may be any non-
negative integer (˜ n) less than or equal to ¯ n. For technical convenience, we
assume that there are only two possible realizations of ˜ n, low and high,
4Note that since there is only one overlapping life period, the grandparent, parent and
child never coexist in the same period, and hence in our model the preference-shaping
mechanism of Stark (1995) cannot be operative by assumption.
4respectively denoted as ˜ n = nl and ˜ n = nh. To avoid notational complexity,
we simply assume nl = 0 and nh  n.
The probability of having n (instead of zero) children surviving to their
young age, denoted p(:), depends on their nutrition condition as well as their
parent’s possible support to the young. We assume that
p =
(
p(c); if the old parent is dead;
p(c); if the old parent is alive,
(1)
where   1 characterizes the possible help of old parents toward the sur-
vival of children, and p(c) is an increasing and concave function of family
consumption c, satisfying
Assumption 1: p(0) = 0, p(c)  1 for all c, p0(c) > 0, and p00(c) < 0.
Clearly, if  = 1 in (1), then the post-reproductive old parent is “useless”.
We shall come back to its discussion later.
The parent may keep some savings for the consumption of her old age. If
co is available for her old-age consumption, then the probability that she sur-
vives her old (second) period of life is p2(co). Because all concavity needed for
an interior maximization has been provided by p(c) according to Assumption
1, to simplify our analysis we shall assume that p2 is linear in the relevant
range:
Assumption 2: p2(co) = 0 if co  0; p2(co) = aco if 0 < co  b=a; and
p2(co) = b if b=a < co:
2.2 Two Kinds of Dynastic Utility Functions
As with all species, people are assumed to have forward altruism toward their
oﬀspring, in the sense that they care about the survival of their oﬀspring.
We therefore have a lineage “dynasty” similar to the one described in Laitner
(1979) and Chu (1991). Suppose every person attaches a constant utility k to
5all current and future surviving oﬀspring in the lineage. Because we have an
overlapping generation structure, in each period there are family members of
two diﬀerent ages. We assume that the old are relatively weak to make any
resource allocation decisions; hence all allocations are dictated by the young.
For a young individual with forward altruism, her dynasty utility in period
0 is assumed to have the following form:




tNtPr(Nt)[k + p2(ct)k]; (2)
where k is the utility of surviving,  < 1 is the discount rate, co is the
consumption she prepares for her own old age, p2(ct) is the probability that
the individual can survive her own old age given the period-t consumption ct,
and Pr(Nt) is the probability that the individual has Nt young-age surviving
descendants in period t.5 In the above expression, the ﬁrst two terms are the
utility of the decision maker herself, and the summation term captures the
utility from the survival of all future descendants.6
An alternative preference structure is that, other than the natural forward
altruism speciﬁed in (2), each young individual also has “backward altruism”,
5Since our purpose is to “explain” the origin of backward altruism, it is better that we
do not “assume” other unreasonable preferences to start with. It seems then necessary
for us to explain why in (2) there is a time preference  < 1. Fortunately, the literature
has done some of the work. Rogers (1994) argues that if preferences have been shaped
by natural selection, then individuals should be indiﬀerent to choices that have the same
ﬁtness index. He shows that a time preference factor consistent with biological theories is
about 2 percent per year. See also Hansson and Stuart (1990).
6Here we do not assume any utility of consumption for the following three reasons:
First, it increases notation complexity without providing additional insight. Second, for
most periods in the primitive environment, as the Malthusian theory describes, human
beings were indeed ﬁghting for their survival. Third, if we allow variable consumptions,
then there will be variable savings, which in turn imply variable initial incomes for children.
In that case we will have income as a continuous state variable. The corresponding Euler-
Lotka equation will then be integrated, in addition to age, over variable incomes, which is
unnecessarily complicated for our purpose.
6in the sense that she cares about the survival of her old parent. In this case,
the utility structure speciﬁed in (2) should be revised as




tNtPr(Nt)[p2(mt)k +k +p2(ct)k]; (3)
where the ﬁrst term indicates her utility from seeing her parent surviving
her second period of life, m is the consumption of the currently old parent,
mt is the consumption of the period-t decision maker’s parent, and  is the
backward-altruism parameter assigned to the parent. Other terms in (3) are
the same as those in (2). Evidently, if  = 0, then (3) degenerates to (2).7
2.3 Budget Constraint and Income Dynamics
As mentioned above, the young individual is the one who makes the resource
allocation decision. If she has y amount of income to start with, then she
has to divide it into consumption by family members (c), savings for her
own future (s), and ﬁlial support (m) due to possible backward altruism. In
general, the more family consumption there is, the better nutrition children
will have, and hence the larger the survival probability the children face.
This is why we propose Assumption 1 and write p(:) as p(c).
Suppose that for every unit of food saved, there will be  units for next-
period consumption. For a young decision maker, her budget constraint is
c + s + m  y: (4)
The young individual should maximize (2) or (3) subject to the constraint
(4).8
7Suppose a child and a parent are mutually altruistic toward each other. Let the
former’s utility be U = u + a1V and the latter’s utility be V = v + a2U. The reduced
form looks like U = (u+a1v)=(1a1a2). In our equation (3), the parameter of backward
altruism, , can be treated as a1=(1a1a2): See Bergstrom (1997) for more details of the
discussion.
8In reality, food consumption for the young and the old may be chosen diﬀerently, and
7We now follow Lee (2003) and specify how the income dynamics are
determined. Suppose the land size is A and the young population in the
society during period t is Pt. The total output in the primitive society is
f(Pt;A). Assume that all young workers share the output equally, then each
of them gets wt = f(Pt;A)=Pt of return. In a stationary state the population
size is ﬁxed,9 so that wt will be a constant w. We shall ﬁrst concentrate on
this stationary state, and then later come back to the more general case with
variable wt.
2.4 The Euler-Lotka Selection Parameter
Since there are only two life periods in our model, we have a simple discrete





where la is the probability an individual can survive to age a, and ma is the
average number of births for a person of age a. Because we assume that
people are reproductive only in their ﬁrst period of life and that the number
of surviving children is n with probability p(c), the above equation can be
further simpliﬁed as
Bt = Bt1np(c):
Substituting Bt = B0ert into the expression above presents the following
Euler-Lotka equation:
e
r = np(c): (5)
According to Hamilton (1966) and Rose (1991), a behavior or a mutation
is said to be positively selected if it corresponds to a larger parameter r.
hence the young may have a wider decision domain. However, this concern complicates the
analytical structure without warranting any further insight of inter-dependent utilities.
9There was nearly no population growth in the primitive society over a long period of
human history. See Robson and Kaplan (2003).
8Equation (5) clearly says that this positive selection can happen only if the
corresponding c is larger.
3 An Interpretation of the Literature
As we mentioned in the previous section, if  is signiﬁcantly larger than one
in (1), then the old parent’s survival may help the selection. But even in
this case, the children might not want to support their helpful old parents
for various reasons. Below we shall provide a typical cause and relate it to
the existing literature.
Suppose the parent needs z amount of resource to survive, which renders
each child an extra burden z=n  ∆x. When each child contributes this
resource, her optimization problem speciﬁed in section 2 changes. Suppose it
costs her c  ∆r=∆x in terms of ﬁtness, where r is the Euler-Lotka parameter
in (5). The survival of the parent increases the probability (by ∆  1) of
live births, which is assumed to correspond to a beneﬁt b  ∆r=∆ in terms
of ﬁtness. If parents are helpful, we know that b > c. However, some of the
parent’s help to her n children may be in the form of wisdom or experience,
which is a public good. Any individual child may have an incentive to free-
ride on her siblings by not-supporting the parent while “overhearing” the
wisdom told. This defection strategy beneﬁts the child herself at the cost of
her siblings.
As such, the problem among siblings reduces to the problem of coordi-
nation failure in a prisoners’ dilemma game played by siblings, just like the
one described in Bergstrom (1995). He showed that as long as the average
payoﬀ of being coorperative is large (relative to the payoﬀ corresponding
to the selﬁsh strategy), a coorperative mutant can survive or even domi-
nate. Intuitively, what backward altruism can do in this case is to raise the
subjective payoﬀs corresponding to the “support-the-parent” (coorperative)
9strategy, and hence facilitate the realization of the cooperative equilibrium.
Since parents’ survival is beneﬁcial to selection by assumption (b > c), the
backward altruism in the context of being cooperative will be selected.
An implicit feature in the above example is the presumption that old
parents are “useful” to selection and should be supported, but it may not
be the case in general. If the ancient environment was so tough that most
species die before the end of their reproductive ages, then they all have to
ﬁght for their survival to be selected. A long enough evolution would breed
in nearly all species the tendency of ﬁghting for their survival. After the
exogenous environment gradually improves, even when the survival of the
post-reproductive old may not be helpful to selection, the instinct of ﬁght-
ing for survival does not seem to disappear easily, as borne out by human
experience and the experience of other species. This is consistent with the
evolutionary pattern described in Charlesworth (1994 p.187).10 But when
“useless” people ﬁght to survive, they crowd out resources of other individ-
uals. We shall argue that, other than facilitating the coordination between
siblings or across generations, backward altruism may also help avoid the
adoption of ineﬃcient strategies by the old. To highlight our point, in what
follows we shall consider the extreme case where old parents are completely
useless in the sense that they are not only post-reproductive but also no
longer provide any downward transfers to their children. As such, we force
ourselves to ﬁnd out the possible objective causes that may push the children
to support their old parents.
10For economists, it is not surprising to have a preference structure not entirely consis-
tent with genetic ﬁtness. Indeed, when people are assumed to maximize their “utility”
function, almost by deﬁnition the utility index does not have to be related to genetic ﬁt-
ness. When demographic economists talk about “quantity-quality tradeoﬀs” of children,
there seems to be little reason to believe that the quality improvement in children can
compensate, in terms of the Euler-Lotka parameter, the drop in the quantity of children.
104 Should One Save for One’s Old Age?
From now on we shall consider the case with  = 1 in (1), meaning that
post-reproductive old parents are useless to their children. In this section we
shall separate our discussion into two cases: without backward altruism and
with backward altruism. Our strategy is to derive conditions under which
parents’ optimal savings are zero in the latter case and positive in the former
case. Under these conditions, the role of children as “refrigerators” (eﬃcient
means of preserving resources other than savings) in the case with backward
altruism is most evident, and the potential advantage of backward altruism
is intuitively clear. Later we shall derive the exact parameter range that
supports the selection of backward altruism.
4.1 Without Backward Altruism: Shall Save
For the preference structure with only forward altruism, as described in (2),
it can be easily seen that the young individual’s problem is characterized by
the following Bellman equation:11
v(w) = max
c+swk + p2(s)k + fn  p(c) + 0  [1  p(c)]gv(w)
= max
0swk + p2(s)k + np(w  s)v(w)  max
0sw(s); (6)
where  is the maximand on the right-hand side of (6). The meaning of the
above expression is clear: the decision maker takes whatever her children can
achieve [v(w)] as given and then maximizes the sum of her own utility and
the expected utility from all her surviving children. For (6) to be well deﬁned,
economists often make the following assumption, of which the interpretation
is given below.
Assumption 3: n < 1.
11Concerning the logic behind the Bellman principle, see for instance Sheldon Ross
(1992) for details.
11Because the random variable n is discrete (countable) and the v(:) func-
tion is independent of n, the measurability of the product set spanned by c,
s; and n is trivially true. Furthermore, k + p2(s)k is evidently positive,
bounded, and continuous in s, and Assumption 3 warrants the boundedness
of the value function. Applying Theorem 9.2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989 pp.
246-7), we know that expression (6) does characterize the optimal solution
of the agent under Assumptions 1-3. Note that although v is not aﬀected by
the decision variables c and s, it is indeed a function of parameters such as
 and . We shall use this property in our proof in the Appendix.
Now we can establish our ﬁrst Proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. As long as co has not
reached the upper bound b=a in Assumption 1, the young individual’s op-








The proof is given in Appendix 1. Intuitively, the larger a is, the more
eﬀective it will be for the individual to save for her own old-age support. The
larger np0=[1p(w)] is, the more valuable will be the expenditure on family
consumption. Proposition 1 simply spells out the exact relationship of the
above tradeoﬀ.
4.2 With Backward Altruism: Shall Not Save
We next come to the case where the preference structure has forward as well
as backward altruism, as described in (3). The young individual’s problem,
given that her old parent has s0 savings, is characterized by the Bellman
equation below:
v(w;s0) = max
c+s+mwk + p2(s0 + nm)k + np(c)v(w;s) + [1  p(c)]p2(s)k
12= max
c;s k + p2(s0 + n(w  c  s))k
+np(c)v(w;s) + [1  p(c)]p2(s)k  max
c;s (s;c): (7)
In the above expression, the ﬁrst term is the utility of the young decision
maker for her being able to survive, and the second term is her utility of seeing
her old parent survive, of which the probability is p2(s+nm). The argument
in p2(:) has a term nm other than the old parent’s remaining savings s; if
each of the n now-surviving children donates m to the parent due to their
backward altruism. The third term is the utility from future oﬀspring; the v
function has a second argument s because the state variable now includes the
savings kept by the surviving parent.12 If the decision maker has n surviving
children in the next period, which has probability p(c), then she will enjoy
indirect utility nv(w;s).13 The ﬁnal term will be realized only if the decision
maker does not have any surviving children, which has probability [1p(c)].
In that case, she will count on her own savings in her old age and have p2(s)
probability of survival. From (7), we can establish:
Proposition 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. As long as co has not
reached the upper bound b=a in Assumption 1, s and m cannot be positive
at the same time. Furthermore, if  < minfn;1g, then the optimal saving
(ﬁlial support) of an agent with backward altruism is equal to (larger than)
zero. If  > maxfn;1g, then the optimal saving (ﬁlial support) is larger
than (equal to) zero.
The proof of proposition 2 is given in Appendix 2. Because we have
assumed a linear function for p2(:), it is not surprising that m and s, which
are both means of preparing old-age consumption, cannot coexist, for one of
12Term s does not enter the indirect utility v of (6) in the case without backward altruism
because children do not care how much the surviving parents save.
13Note that m  0 warrants that the parent will do better by relying on her children
(than living alone), hence (7) indeed characterizes her optimal solution in terms of residing
status.
13the two must have a larger marginal return. The second part of Proposition 2
tells us that if backward altruism () is strong enough, or if the return rate on
savings () is small enough, then individuals would rather replace savings by
other spendings. Intuitively, with strong backward altruism, people’s old-age
support is expected to be supplied by children, and hence it is unnecessary
to use the means of ineﬀective savings to secure their old age. The only case
of being insecure is when the person has no surviving children, which is an
event with probability p(c). And that is why we vary the values of p(c) in
our calculation in Appendix 2 to obtain our ﬁnal parameter condition.
4.3 The Critical Range of 
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain a range of parameters in which
an individual will save without backward altruism and will not save with







 !2: [R] (8)
Expression (8) is important for our later analytical discussion, because when
 is in range R, the unsaved resources under backward altruism can be used to
feed the young children in order to increase the number of future descendants.
In this sense, children become the refrigerator for their parents, which helps
the latter “preserve” the food.
In (8), if  is very small, then the rate of return to savings is so low that
the individual will not save anyway, even if there is no backward altruism. In
this case, children will have no incentive to support the parents who would
not dispose their resources ineﬃciently. Thus, backward altruism cannot be
supported in this scenario. If  is very large, then savings are so rewarding
that the individual will never want to give up this channel of resource dispo-
sition, even if there is backward altruism. In this case, the strategy of using
14children as refrigerators is no longer eﬃcient, the optimal ﬁlial feedback (m)
is zero, and backward altruism cannot be supported either. Expression (8)
says that when the rate of return on savings is somewhere in between the
two extremes, backward altruism is more likely to appear.
5 Comparing the Two Regimes in [R]
We showed in the previous discussion that expression (8) characterizes a
possible region for backward altruism to be sustained. Now we propose to
study when backward altruism will really arise.
Suppose expression (8) holds. As we showed in section 4, the optimal
savings in (7) are always zero, so that the variable s and s0 in the value
function can be dropped. As such, since p2(0) = 0 by Assumption 2, we can
rewrite (7) as
v(w) = max
c+mwk + p2(nm)k + np(c)v(w): (9)
Comparing (9) with (6), we ﬁnd that they are extremely similar: if we rede-
ﬁne the control variable m in (9) as s, and let parameter  equal  and n in
p2(:) equal , then (6) and (9) are exactly the same. The similarity between
(6) and (9) allows us to compare the size of optimal consumptions derived.









It is easy to see that (9) can be approached from (10) by letting  go to  and
q go to n. Alternatively, if  =  and q = , then we have the original state
of (6). As  and q increase, we want to establish the comparative statics
with respect to the optimal consumption c.
15The ﬁrst-order condition of (10) is
@ 
@m
= aqk  np
0v(w)  ∆m = 0; (11)
where p0 is the short-hand writing of p0(w  m). Assumption 1 guarantees
that the second-order condition of maximizing   is satisﬁed. We prove in
Appendix 3 the following two Propositions.
Proposition 3: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. If expression (8) is satisﬁed
and (10) has an interior solution, then the sign of @m
@ is positive, meaning
that the optimal consumption (w  m) decreases as  increases.
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. If expression (8) is satisﬁed
and (10) has an interior solution, then the sign of @m
@q is positive, meaning
that the optimal consumption (w  m) decreases as q increases.
Proposition 3 is intuitively clear: an increase in the backward altruism
parameter increases a person’s intention to leave more to the old parent,
and hence the remaining consumption must be reduced. The interpretation
of proposition 4 is similar, and is therefore omitted. Propositions 3 and 4
combined tell us that the optimal c decreases when  or q increases. As such,
we can draw an iso-consumption line, as shown by l1 in Figure 1, which must
be negatively-sloped according to Propositions 3 and 4. To the northeast
(southwest) of l1, the consumption will decrease (increase).
Suppose the original (0;q0) = (;) combination is at point A in Figure
1. If we consider a new scenario with (1;q1) = (;n), we want to know
where the location of (;n) is that may allow itself to be selected. Let the
hyperbola passing through A be line l2. From (8) we know that  < n
must hold in range R, so that the (;n) point should be on the northeast
direction of the hyperbola l2. Expression (8) also implies !1 < , which
deﬁnes an upper bound for n, denoted n, in Figure 1.
There are two possible cases for the shape of l1, depending on whether or
16not line l1 is steeper than the tangent line of l2 at A. If l1 is steeper (ﬂatter),
then case a (b) of Figure 1 applies. Combining the above, we know that for
(;n) to be selected, it can only be located in the lined area in either case.
Note that the actual region for (;n) to be selected is larger than the shaded
area because  < !2 characterizes the suﬃcient condition of zero-saving in
the scenario with backward altruism; it is not a necessary condition.
Suppose, for instance, we are in a primitive society, so that  may be less
that 1. Since n > 1 > , we know that backward altruism can be selected
only in case a of Figure 1. In this case, the parameter of backward altruism
should be less than the discount rate . Another interesting contemporary
case is when there is a high interest rate across periods so that  may be
larger than n. In this situation, (;n) may be selected only in case b of
Figure 1, in which  is larger than .
6 Numerical Analysis
In section 5 we discussed extensively the change of c with respect to changes
in (;q). In this section we use a simulation to demonstrate the advantage of
backward altruism when the rate of return on savings  and other parameters
change.
We consider the functional form p(c) = [c=(w + z)], and specify the
following parameter values: n = 2;  = :4; w = 1; a = b = :7;  = :45; k =










According to Propositions 1 and 2, we know that in the case without back-
ward altruism the optimal savings amount is zero (so that the optimal con-
sumption is 1) if and only if  is smaller than .2857. In the case with backward
17altruism, the optimal savings is positive if  is larger than 2.2222. Both these
are conﬁrmed in our simulation, as shown in Figure 2.
We now compare the consumption paths derived under diﬀerent cases.
For the case without backward altruism, our Proposition 4 says that the
optimal consumption is a decreasing function of , as long as a corner solution
in p2(:) is not reached. When  reaches roughly 1.25, as one can see from
Figure 2, this corner solution is reached, and savings (consumption) begin
to decrease (increase). For the case with backward altruism, when  is less
than 2.2222, the optimal savings are zero, so that the optimal consumption
does not change with , the rate of return on savings. When  is larger than
2.2222, the agent begins to take advantage of this good return and save. This
helps to make her optimal consumption increase. In this case, savings become
the main means of old-age support, and the role of children is not important.
Thus, the two optimal consumption lines with or without backward altruism
merge in this range. This is what we see in Figure 2.
Under the numerical values chosen, we see that the two optimal con-
sumption lines cross each other. This means that there is a critical range
of  (roughly [:6;2:0]) such that only for  in this range, the optimal con-
sumption corresponding to the case with backward altruism is larger, and
hence backward altruism will be selected. Note that backward altruism will
not be selected if the rate of return on savings is too low or too high, when
the advantage of children acting as refrigerators is not revealed. Thus, in
a gatherer-hunter society when most resources can only sustain for several
days, or in our times where savings are likely to generate a rate of return
much larger than rearing children, our theory as well as simulation suggest
that such environment is not suitable to develop or to sustain backward al-
truism.
Now we consider the case of varying . We choose  = 1:25 and reset
a = :5; all other parameters are the same as before. As one can see from
18Figure 3, the optimal consumption path with backward altruism is higher
only when  is not very large. When  is larger than 0.28 in Figure 3, we
see that backward altruism is no longer selected. This is consistent with
what we described in previous sections: since old parents in our setup is not
“useful” by assumption, a strong backward altruism cannot be selected, for
it pays too much attention to the useless group. Useless parents by deﬁnition
cannot provide much support to children; but even people who cannot provide
help may still be less “harmful”, if they can avoid disposing resources in an
ineﬃcient way.
7 Relaxing Some Assumptions
We have made some simplifying assumptions in order to derive the analytical
results in previous sections. In this section we shall see how the structure
should be modiﬁed if these assumptions are weakened. Here, we only point
out the directions of possible extensions; analytical or simulation details are
not speciﬁed here.
7.1 Useful Parents
In the previous few sections we have assumed, mainly for the purpose of ar-
gument, that  = 1 in (1), so that post-reproductive parents are not “useful”
to their children. But as Lee (2003) pointed out, there are various forms of
downward transfers, such as cooking and other household work that post-
reproductive old folks can help their adult children. It can be seen that in
this case, adult children will have some incentives to support their parents.




k + ˜ p2k + np(c)  [p2ov(w;s) + (1  p2o)v(w;s)]
i
(12)
˜ m = argm max
m;s;c
h
k + ˜ p2k + np(c)  [p2ov(w;s) + (1  p2o)v(w;s)]
i
19where ˜ p2 = p2(s + n˜ m), p2o = p2(so + nm), and the second argument in v
characterizes the initial savings of the old parent. Individuals now know that
their parents’ survival is helpful to increasing p1, and may have incentives to
choose m > 0, as one can easily see from (12). In a steady state equilibrium,
the optimal m chosen by a child must be the same as the one chosen by her
mother, as shown by the second equation of (12). For the case with backward
altruism, a similar formulation can be written. It is clear that attaching a
positive term of backward altruism to the objective function helps increase
the individual’s incentive of backward transfers. When  is large, backward
altruism is certainly more likely to be selected.
7.2 More General Behavior Rules
Implicit in equation (7) was the assumption that once there is a change in
period t that makes individual A carry the altruistic parameter , the same
attitude will be held for all future oﬀspring of A. However, we know that this
is not true, especially when the society is comprised of a variety of people
and the reproduction of children involves parents from diﬀerent origins. How
should the analysis be revised under this situation?
Let v(w;b) be the value function of an individual when the parameter of
backward altruism she has is b. Suppose that b = 0 originally, and a change
makes b =  > 0. Suppose there is a probability u that her children will
have b =  and (1  u) probability that her children will have b = 0. In this
case, the individual should solve the following system of equations:
v(w;s0;) = max
c+s+mwk + p2(s0 + nm)k +
np(c)[u  v(w;s;) + (1  u)  v(w;s;0)] + [1  p(c)]p2(s)k
v(w;s0;0) = max
c+swk + u 
h
np(c)v(w;s;) + [1  p(c)]p2(s)k
i
+
(1  u)  [np(c)v(w;s;0) + p2(s)]: (13)
20We shall skip the interpretation of the above equations.
An analysis of (13) will be diﬃcult in general. However, it is not hard
to see that if u ! 1, then v(w;s0;0) is not relevant, the equation system in
(13) actually degenerates to (7), and our original result remains true. The
more complicated case is when u is variable according to the population
composition in the society. The analytics along this line will have to rely on
some simpliﬁed assumptions.14
7.3 Variable Number of Children
In our set-up in sections 3 and 4, there are only two possible realizations of
the number of children: nl = 0 and nh = n. If, as it is in general, any positive
integer n < ¯ n may be realized, then each decision maker may face a diﬀerent
number of siblings, which in turn involves a change in our setting. For an
altruistic individual, the existing number of her siblings aﬀects how the ﬁlial-
support expenses are to be shared. The more surviving siblings there are,
the less burden an individual will have from supporting her parent. Thus,
other than the wage, the number of siblings will also become a state variable.
When there are many possible realizations of n, the Bellman equation in
(7) should be rewritten as
v(w;s0;n0) = max










In the above expression, p(njc) is the probability of having n surviving chil-
dren when the family consumption is c, n is the number of her children, and
n0 is the size of surviving siblings of the decision maker. The meaning of
(14) should be clear and hence we skip its interpretation.
14See for instance Juang (2001) and the references therein for more details.
21As the reader can see, when we relax our assumption of ﬁxed number of
children, the space of state variables will become complicated. Conceptually,
it may be the case that individuals with few surviving siblings tend not to
support their parents, because the cost-sharing is less eﬃcient. The analyti-
cal comparative statics seem to become diﬃcult, but complications like this
should not interfere with the simulation analysis.
8 Conclusions
As Hamilton (1966) pointed out, a well-known principle in biology is that a
change in behavior which reduces the mortality rate of post-reproductive ages
will not be selected. A corollary of the above proposition is that species are
unlikely to develop backward altruism, because any resource distributed to
an old parent must imply a reduction of resources to the children. Economists
have made some contributions in justifying the existence of kinship altruism.
It has been argued that if kinship altruism can facilitate the coordination
between kins and promote the realization of an eﬃcient outcome, then it will
be selected.
In this paper we propose a theory of the evolution of backward altruism
complementary to the existing ones. We assume that in a primitive economy,
there are few goods or capital stocks that the old parent can save eﬃciently,
although the instinct desire of sustaining one’s own life induces the parent to
save for her old age. Hence, the resources remaining for the children would
be limited. Suppose cultural pressure or a mutation causes an individual
become backward-altruistic. She then expects that her children may have
the same attitude as hers, and therefore they may take care of her when she
is old. With this expectation in mind, this individual can avoid ineﬃcient
savings and hence her children may obtain more food. Thus, the backward
altruism serves the purpose of avoiding an ineﬃcient way of disposing re-
22sources. Parents do not have to be useful to their children in order for the
latter to support the former; in fact, backward altruism renders the parents
“less harmful”.
The altruistic support for the old in our model is somewhat like a pay-as-
you-go pension system. These transfers can be rationalized if the young are
likely to prepare their old-age support and dispose resources in an ineﬃcient
way. This is more likely to happen in ancient times when social mechanisms
are primitive. Our expression (8) proposes a range of rate of return to savings
in which backward altruism is likely to arise. It may be worthwhile for
historians to study and verify whether such an inequality helps explain the
origin of backward altruism in a human society.
23Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiating  with respect to s and using Assumption 2 yield
@
@s
= ak  np
0(c)v(w)  Ωs: (A1)
We want to see when we will have an interior solution for s, and hence we
should evaluate expression (A1) at s = 0. If savings are set to be s = 0,
then c must be c = w. Assumption 2 implies that the corresponding value
function v(:) from (6) should satisfy
v(w)js=0 = k + np(w)v(w)js=0;
which gives us the solution v(w)js=0 = k=[1  np(w)]. Evaluating (A1) at










Since @2=@s2 < 0 by Assumption 1, we obtain Proposition 1.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
We want to study when the optimal savings s will be zero in the scenario
with backward altruism. Diﬀerentiating  in (7) with respect to s, we have
@
@s
= akn + np(c)
@v(w;s)
@s
+ [1  p(c)]ak: (A3)
Using the envelop theorem, we see from (7) that @v=@s0 = ak for all s0 in
the relevant range. Substituting this result back into (A3), we have
@
@s
= akf[p(c)(n  1) + 1]  n]: (A4)
Note that the right-hand-side of (A4) is independent of s, and only depends
on c. This means that for any given s, unless the upper bound of co = b=a
of p2(:) is reached, @=@s is either positive or negative, and hence m and s
cannot be positive at the same time.
24Concerning the sign of (A4), we separate our discussion into two cases.
If n  1, then the right-hand side of (A4) attains its maximum at p(c) = 1.
In this case we see that @ =@s < akn(  1); which is negative if  < 1.
If n < 1, then the right-hand side of (A4) attains its maximum at p(c) = 0.
In this case we see that @ =@s < ak(  n); which is negative if  < n:
Thus, the optimal saving is zero if  < minf1;ng.
Note that the optimal saving will be positive if the right-hand-side of (A4)
is positive. We can follow the same logic and see that  > maxfn;1g is a
suﬃcient condition for s to be positive. In summary, we have Proposition 2.
Appendix 3: Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
Because the comparative static analysis of the Bellman equation is not
conventional, in what follows we shall be more detail in our derivation steps.
Equation (10) tells us that v(w) = k(1+ aqm)=(1np); where p 





aqk(1  np  np0m)  np0k
1  np = 0: (A5)




 > 0 (A6)
must hold in order for (A5) to have any interior solution.
Totally diﬀerentiating ∆m = 0 in (11) yields
∆mmdm + ∆md = 0:
We know that ∆mm < 0 by the second-order condition. As for ∆m, we have




From (10) we have @v=@ = amqk+np(@v=@): Thus, @v=@ = amqk=(1
np): Substituting this formula back into ∆m, we get
∆m = aqk




25Inequality (A6) tells us that the numerator in the above square brackets is
positive. Hence, we have Proposition 3.
Totally diﬀerentiating (11) we have ∆mmdm + ∆mqdq = 0. The sign of
∆mm is negative by the second-order condition. Concerning ∆mq, we have






Using this result, we see that
∆mq =
ak[1  np  np0m]
1  np :
Similar to what we did to derive (A6), we see that (1npnp0m) must
be positive in order to have an interior solution of c. Thus, ∆mq > 0 and
we have Proposition 4.
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